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Abstract
Cyberterrorism, while being written about since the early 2000s, is still
not fully understood as a strategic concept and whether such actions can
be deterred is hotly contested. Some strategists and policy makers
believe that acts of cyberterrorism, especially by non-state actors, may
prove to be undeterrable. Yet the leadership of both state and non-state
actors tend to act rationally and function strategically, and therefore they
can, in fact, be deterred to some degree. Helping to shape the legitimate
options following a significant cyberattack, the Law of Armed Conflict
has salient considerations for the deterrence of cyberterrorism,
particularly the principles of military necessity and lawful targeting.
Furthermore, when considered holistically and using all available means,
deterrence combined with dissuasion activities can lessen the likelihood
of cyberterrorism, while mitigating any consequences should such a
cyberattack actually occur.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/2
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Introduction 
Since the beginning of his Administration, President Barack Obama has 
stated that cybersecurity is one of the most important challenges facing the 
United States.1  In doing so, he noted the irony that the very technologies used 
by the United States that enable great achievements can also be used to 
undermine its security and inflict harm on its citizens.  For instance, the same 
information technologies and defense systems that make the U.S. military so 
advanced are themselves targeted by hackers from China and Russia, 
potentially leading to increased vulnerabilities.  Consequently, ongoing and 
persistent cyberattacks are considered a threat to U.S. national security.2 
 
Included in this overall cybersecurity challenge that President Obama 
addressed is the threat posed by cyberterrorism.  Unfortunately, while being 
written about since the early 2000’s, cyberterrorism is a concept whose 
definition is still not fully agreed upon.  Confusion over cyberterrorism stems, 
in part, from recent attempts to stretch the concept to include hacktivism and 
terrorists’ use of the Internet to facilitate conventional terrorist actions.3  
Furthermore, some strategists and policy makers believe that acts of 
cyberterrorism, by either states or non-state actors, may prove to be 
undeterrable.4  
 
This view, however, is incorrect or, at best, a half-truth.5  Based upon the 
lessons of history and how conflict in the other media of warfare has 
unfolded, the credible threat of overwhelming force or other severe actions 
can, under the right conditions, deter potential attackers from initiating a 
path of direct confrontation. 
 
Cyberspace and Cyberterrorism 
                                                          
1 Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 9, 2015) available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/09/fact-sheet-administration-
cybersecurity-efforts-2015. 
2 President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Cybersecurity and Consumer 
Protection Summit,” Stanford University, February 13, 2015, available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/remarks-president-
cybersecurity-and-consumer-protection-summit. 
3 Michael Kenney, “Cyber-Terrorism in a Post-Stuxnet World,” Orbis 59:1 (2015): 111-128, 
available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438714000787. 
4 Lewis, Jim, “Speech on the Role of Deterrence,” Space Security Symposium, Stimson 
Center, November 15, 2012, available at:  http://www.stimson.org/about/news/jim-
lewis-of-csis-speaks-at-stimson-on-cyber-deterrence/. 
5 Gray, Colin S., National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities (Dulles, VA: 
Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 62. 
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The cyber domain, or cyberspace, has been defined by Andrew Krepinevich 
as:  
 
“[the world’s] computer networks, both open and closed, to include the 
computers themselves, the transactional networks that send data 
regarding financial transactions, and the networks comprising control 
systems that enable machines to interact with one another.”6   
 
As such, the cyber domain utilizes expansive lines of communication 
involving a global network, along with hubs of activity at server farms or 
network hardware locations.7  Cyber activities involve international commerce 
and finance, social media, information sharing, and more recently, military-
led activities.8 
 
When considering whether or how acts of terrorism in the cyber domain can 
be deterred, the definition of cyberterrorism provided by Dorothy Denning in 
2000 before the House Armed Services Committee proves useful. 
 
“Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and 
terrorism.  It refers to unlawful attacks and threats of attacks 
against computers, networks and the information stored 
therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its 
people in furtherance of political or social objectives.  Further, 
to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in 
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough 
harm to generate fear.  Attacks that lead to death or bodily 
injury, explosions, or severe economic loss would be 
examples.  Serious attacks against critical infrastructures 
could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. 
Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a 
costly nuisance would not.”9 
                                                          
6 Andrew F.Krepinevich, “Cyber Warfare: A ‘Nuclear Option’?” Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 2012, p. 8, available at: 
http://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/cyber-warfare-a-nuclear-option/. 
7 John J. Klein, “Some Principles of Cyber Strategy,” International Relations and 
Security Network, August 21, 2014, available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?id=182955. 
8 David E. Sanger, David Barboza, and Nicole Perlroth, “Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as 
Tied to Hacking Against U.S.,” NYTimes.com, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-
hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
9 Dorothy Denning, “Cyberterrorism,” Testimony to the Special Oversight Panel on 
Terrorism, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. House of 
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Under this “severity of effects” determination, computer attacks that are 
limited in scope, but that lead to death, injury, extended power outages, 
airplane crashes, water contamination, or major loss of confidence in portions 
of the economy may also qualify as cyberterrorism.10 
 
When considering the definition above, cyberterrorism does not include acts 
of hacktivism.  Hacktivism is a term used by many scholars to describe the 
marriage of hacking with political activism.11  Similar to the actions of 
hackers, hacktivism includes activities conducted online and covertly that 
seek to reveal, manipulate, or otherwise exploit vulnerabilities in computer 
operating systems and other software.  Differing from hacktivists, those 
considered solely as hackers do not necessarily have political agendas.12  
 
Hacktivism, though motivated for political reasons, does not amount to 
cyberterrorism.  While hacktivists typically seek to disrupt Internet traffic or 
computer networks as a form of public protest, they do not typically want to 
kill, maim, or terrify in the process.13  The recent successes of hacktivists, 
however, do highlight the potential threat of cyberterrorism in that a few 
individuals with little to no moral restraint may use methods similar to 
hackers to wreak havoc, generate fear, and cause severe injury or death.14  The 
line between cyberterrorism and hacktivism, however, may sometimes blur. 
This is could be especially true if terrorist groups are able to recruit or hire 
computer-savvy hacktivists for their cause or if hacktivists decide to escalate 
their actions by attacking the systems that operate critical elements of the 
national infrastructure, such as electric power networks and emergency 
services.15 
 
Security experts have argued for some time that the energy sector has become 
a potential target for cyberattack through the creation of Internet links—both 
physical and wireless—that interfere with the supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems used by electrical and power distribution 
                                                                                                                                                              
Representatives, May 23, 2000, available at: www.stealth-
iss.com/documents/pdf/cyberterrorism.pdf. 
10 Dorothy Denning, “Is Cyber Terror Next?” Social Science Research Council, November 
2001, available at: http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/denning.htm. 
11  Wiemann, Gabriel, Cyberterrorism: How Real Is the Threat? (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, December 2004): 4, available at: 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr119.pdf. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid., 5. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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networks.16  SCADA systems manage the flow of electricity and natural gas, 
while also being used to control the industrial systems and facilities used by 
chemical processing plants, water purification and water delivery operations, 
wastewater management facilities, and a host of manufacturing firms.17  
Studies have indicated that critical infrastructures that include SCADA 
systems may be vulnerable to a cyberterrorist attack because the 
infrastructure and the computer systems used are highly complex, making it 
effectively impossible to eliminate all potential weaknesses.18  It is believed by 
many security professionals that a terrorist’s ability to control, disrupt, or 
alter the command and monitoring functions performed by SCADA systems 
could threaten regional or national security.19 
 
Cyberterrorism, when considered generally, may be conducted by either state 
or non-state actors, but the calculus and implications can be quite different 
for each category.  Of note, the U.S. Department of State lists three designated 
state sponsors of terrorism in 2015: Iran, Sudan, and Syria.20  State sponsored 
cyberterrorism would most likely be conducted to achieve the goals as defined 
by the state’s political leadership and any actions would tend to support long-
term national security goals.  Even though the cyber domain offers a bit of 
anonymity, if a cyberattack is traced back to its network source or Internet 
address, then the physical location of those perpetrating the attack could be 
determined within the boundaries of the state authorizing the cyberattack.  
Because states have geographic boundaries and the initiating computer 
networks potentially have a physical location, there is increased likelihood, 
when compared to non-state actors, that those responsible for initiating a 
state-sponsored cyberattack would be identified. 
 
In contrast, non-state actors—to include many terrorist organizations—do not 
necessarily act uniformly or according to the same underlying beliefs, and 
                                                          
16 Wilson, Clay, Computer Attack and Cyber Terrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues 
for Congress, CRS Report RJ32114 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, October 17, 2003): 12-13, available at: 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2JlpsJ6zCi8J:fas.org/irp/crs
/RL32114.pdf+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 
17 Stouffer, Keith, Joe Falco, Karen Kent, Guide to Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2006): 2-1, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/csd-nist-
guidetosupervisoryanddataccquisition-scadaandindustrialcontrolsystemssecurity-
2007.pdf. 
18 Weimann, “Cyberterrorism,” 6.  
19 Ibid., 7. 
20 U.S. Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” State.gov, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. 
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many of the most aggressive organizations are motivated by an ideology that 
embraces martyrdom and an apocalyptic vision.21  This ideology may be based 
on religion or a desire to overthrow a government.  Terrorists who are 
motivated by ideology and intend to conduct cyberattacks against the United 
States or its interests may not care about the repercussions following an act of 
cyberterrorism, whether military in scope or not.  In such a scenario, some 
strategists think a terrorist organization's leadership may prove undeterrable 
by traditional military means.22  Despite the disparate motivators of 
terrorists, many terrorist organizations, to include al-Qaida and the self-
proclaimed Islamic State, are said by some security experts to function 
strategically and rationally.23  Because a terrorist organization’s leadership 
may be inclined to make rational decisions, deterrence may at times be a 
suitable method of influencing future actions.  Consequently, deterrence 
should be considered a critical element in a successful national strategy to 
prevent cyberterrorism.  
 
The Advantages of Cyberterrorism 
There are several advantages to using the cyber domain to conduct acts of 
terrorism.  First, cyberterrorism can be far less expensive than traditional 
terrorist methods.24  Potentially, all that is needed is a personal computer and 
an Internet connection, instead of needing to buy weapons, like guns or 
explosives, or acquire transportation.25  Second, cyberterrorism has the 
potential for being more anonymous than traditional, kinetic methods.26  It 
can be difficult for security and police agencies to track down the identity of 
terrorists when they use online “screen names” or are an unidentified “guest 
user.”27  Third, the number of potential targets is enormous when compared 
to the number of targets typically used in kinetic actions.  The cyberterrorist 
could target the computer networks of governments, individuals, public 
utilities, private airlines, SCADA systems, and other critical networks. The 
sheer number of potential cyber targets is thought to increase the likelihood 
                                                          
21 Payne, Keith B., How Much is Enough?: A Goal-Driven Approach to Defining Key 
Principles (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2009), 5. 
22 Executive Office of the President, The National Security Strategy of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: White House, May 2002), 15, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 
23 Gray, National Security Dilemmas, 72. 
24 Weimann, “Cyberterrorism,” 6. 
25 In contrast, some experts argue that sophisticated cyberattacks would require greater 
expense and expertise. See Thomas M. Chen, Cyberterrorism after Stutxnet (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, June 2014), 22-23, available at: 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1211.pdf. 
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Weimann, “Cyberterrorism,” 6.  
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that an adversary can find a weakness or vulnerability in one of the different 
networks to exploit.  Finally, cyberterrorism can be conducted remotely, a 
feature that may be especially appealing to some would-be attackers.  
 
An Exaggerated Threat? 
Many critics have noted, however, that while the potential threat of 
cyberterrorism is alarming and despite all the dire predictions of impending 
attack, no single instance of real cyberterrorism has been recorded.28  To date, 
there has been no recorded instance of cyberterrorism on U.S. public 
facilities, transportation systems, nuclear power plants, power grids, or other 
key components of the national infrastructure.  While cyberattacks on critical 
components of the national infrastructure are not uncommon, such attacks 
have not been conducted in a manner to cause the kind of damage or severity 
of effects that would qualify as cyberterrorism.29  The 2007 widespread denial 
of service cyberattack in Estonia, which brought down the banking system for 
three weeks, did not cause catastrophic damage, injury, or death.30  Even in 
the case of the Stuxnet malware, discovered in June 2010 and called “world’s 
first digital weapon” because of its capability of causing physical destruction 
to computers and other equipment, did not cause widespread, severe 
destructive effects.31   
 
This begs the question: Just how real is the cyberterrorism threat?  While 
cyberterrorism may be an attractive option for modern terrorists who value 
its remote access, anonymity, potential to inflict massive damage, and 
psychological impact, some critics say that cyber fears have been 
exaggerated.32  Furthermore, there is disagreement among some cyber 
experts about whether critical infrastructure computers, to include SCADA 
systems, offer an effective target for furthering terrorists’ goals.33  
 
Many computer security experts do not believe that it is possible to use the 
Internet to inflict damage, injury, or death on a large scale.34  Some of these 
experts note that critical computer systems are resilient to attack through the 
                                                          
28 Chen, Cyberterrorism after Stutxnet, 20. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Jason Richards, “Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for 
U.S. National Security,” International Affairs Review, available at: http://www.iar-
gwu.org/node/65. 
31 Dan Holden, “Is Cyber-Terrorism the New Normal,” Wired, available at: 
http://www.wired.com/insights/2015/01/is-cyber-terrorism-the-new-normal/. 
32 Weimann, “Cyberterrorism,” 8.  
33 Clay, Computer Attack and Cyber Terrorism, 12. 
34 Weimann, “Cyberterrorism,” 8. 
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investments of time, money, and expertise during the design and 
development of these critical systems.  For example, the U.S. Department of 
Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation are 
reported to protect their most critical systems by isolating—also called air-
gapping—them from the Internet and other internal computer networks.35 
 
Despite the ongoing debate about whether the cyberterrorism threat is 
exaggerated or if the potential destructive effects can be sufficiently achieved 
to warrant concern, both the news media and government reporting indicate 
that some terrorist organizations now use the Internet to communicate, 
recruit people, raise funds, and coordinate future attacks.36  Even though 
there is no publically available information that terrorist organizations have 
directly and successfully attacked Internet servers or major computer 
networks, reporting does suggest that many terrorist organizations would 
employ cyber means to achieve their goals if the opportunity presented 
itself.37  Because there appears to be a persistent desire by some terrorist 
organizations to use any and all means, including cyberattacks, to achieve 
their desired goals, it is paramount for policy makers and military planners to 
take preparatory actions to prevent such acts and mitigate any effects should 
such an attack occur.  These preparatory actions include deterrence efforts.  
 
Deterrence and the Law of Armed Conflict 
In a frequently cited definition, deterrence is “persuading a potential enemy 
that it is in his own interest to avoid certain courses of action.”38  The 
underlying basis of cyber deterrence theory—a subset of general deterrence—
is that credible and potentially overwhelming force or other actions against 
any would-be adversary is sufficient to deter most potential aggressors from 
conducting cyberattacks, including those acts considered to be 
cyberterrorism.  When considering deterrence in the cyber domain, it is worth 
considering the advice of Colin Gray, “Given that deterrence can only work, 
when it does, in the minds of enemy leaders, it is their worldview, not ours, 
that must determine whether or not deterrence succeeds.”39  Therefore, to 
deter a potential adversary, we must deter its leadership or decision makers. 
 
                                                          
35 Joshua Green, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism,” Washington Monthly (November 2002), 
available at: http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html. 
36 Kenney, Cyber-Terrorism in a Post-Stuxtnet World. 
37 Chen, Cyberterrorism after Stutxnet, 13. 
38 Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1960), 9. 
39 Gray, National Security Dilemmas, 56. 
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According to deterrence theory, deterrence only works if there is a credible 
threat of retaliatory action or force.  What is considered a credible retaliatory 
action within the U.S. defense community is typically governed by the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC), which is sometimes also referred to as the Law of 
War.  While not directive or preventive of any future action, the ideas and 
principles within the LOAC have relevance when considering any response to 
terrorism, including those in response to cyberterrorism.  
 
The LOAC has been defined as the part of international law that regulates the 
conduct of armed hostilities.40  The LOAC is based on two main sources.  The 
first is customary international law arising out of hostilities and binding on all 
states, and the second is international treaty law arising from international 
treaties, which binds only those states that ratified a particular treaty.41  The 
purpose of the LOAC is to reduce the damage and casualties of any conflict; 
protect combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; 
safeguard the fundamental rights of combatants and noncombatants; and 
make it easier to restore peace after the conflict's conclusion.  
 
Two principles contained in the Law of Armed Conflict are most germane to a 
follow-on act of cyberterrorism, and these are the principles of military 
necessity and lawful targeting.  The first principle, military necessity, calls for 
using only that degree and kind of force required for the partial or complete 
submission of the enemy, while considering the minimum expenditure of 
time, life, and physical resources.42  This principle is designed to limit the 
application of force required for carrying out lawful military purposes. 
Although the principle of military necessity recognizes that some collateral 
damage and incidental injury to civilians may occur when a legitimate 
military target is attacked, it does not excuse the destruction of lives and 
property disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained.43 
 
The second principle, lawful targeting, is based on three assumptions: a 
belligerent’s right to injure the enemy is not unlimited; targeting civilian 
populations for attack is prohibited; and combatants must be distinguished 
                                                          
40 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1–02 (Washington, DC: November 8, 2010), 214, 
available at: http://ra.defense.gov/Portals/56/Documents/rtm/jp1_02.pdf. 
41 U.S. Department of the Navy, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations, NWP 1–14M (Washington, DC: July 2007), 6–5, available at: 
http://www.lawofwar.org/naval_warfare_publication_N-114M.htm. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid. This concept is also referred to as the principle of proportionality. 
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from noncombatants to spare noncombatants injury as much as possible.44 
Consequently, under the principle of lawful targeting, all “reasonable 
precautions” must be taken to ensure that only military objectives are 
targeted in order to avoid, as much as possible, damage to civilian objects 
(collateral damage) and death and injury to civilians (incidental injury).45 
 
An offshoot of the concept of deterrence is extended deterrence, which is 
currently a topic of study and discussion within the U.S. Department of 
Defense.  “Extended deterrence” refers to strengthening regional deterrence 
and reassuring U.S. allies and partners through the credible threat of 
retaliatory force.46  U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees U.S. Cyber 
Command, recently held a conference to discuss and assess the Defense 
Department's ability to deter specific state and non-state actors from 
conducting cyberattacks of significant consequence on the U.S. homeland and 
against U.S. interests, to include attacks resulting in loss of life, significant 
destruction of property, or significant impact on U.S. economic and foreign 
interests.47  A topic of the conference also included identifying ways to deter 
Russia, China, Iran and North Korea from conducting cyberattacks against 
international allies, which is the realm of extended deterrence.48  Based upon 
hundreds of years of treaty precedence, extended deterrence seems to be a 
viable strategic concept in cyberspace.  Article 51, for example, of the Charter 
of the United Nations acknowledges collective self-defense as an inherent 
right of one or more states.49  States being part of an extended deterrence 
agreement, or collective self-defense treaty, should serve as a means of 
discouraging conflict or as a means of coming to the defense of allies should 
deterrence fail.  This concept is still relevant in cyberspace. 
Suitable Responses to Cyberterrorism 
Based upon the principles of military necessity and lawful targeting 
mentioned previously, a military response to cyberterrorism should only 
target and attack military objectives.  Military objectives are combatants and 
those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively 
                                                          
44 Ibid., 8-1. 
45 Ibid. 
46 This definition is taken from the context of nuclear extended deterrence. See The 
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.: April 2010). 
47 “U.S. Military Symposium Will Mull Role of 'Extended Deterrence' In Cyberspace,” 
Inside Defense, July 27, 2015. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Article 51, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (San Francisco, CA: United Nations, 1945), available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf. 
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contribute to the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability.50  They 
also include objects whose total or partial destruction, capture, or 
neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker 
under the circumstances at the time of the attack.51  Additionally, when 
considering the cyber-related military objects to target and attack, it is 
important to understand that it is not unlawful to cause incidental injury to 
civilians, or collateral damage to civilian objects, during an attack upon a 
legitimate military objective.  Incidental injury or collateral damage must not, 
however, be excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the 
attack.52  
 
Related to the principles within the LOAC, in February 2003, the Bush 
administration published a report titled “The National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace” that stated the U.S. government reserves the right to respond “in 
an appropriate manner” if the United States comes under computer attack.53  
This response could involve the use of U.S. cyber weapons or malicious code 
designed to attack and disrupt the targeted computer systems of an 
adversary.54  For any follow-on U.S. military actions to be considered 
“appropriate,” these actions would need to be conducted in the spirit of the 
LOAC. 
 
So, the question to be answered is what specifically is or is not an appropriate 
response following an act of cyberterrorism?  First, taking into account degree 
and kind of force required for the partial or complete submission of the 
enemy, any response—whether kinetic or cyber—should not be considered 
excessive or disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained.  
Consequently, if the aggressor’s cyberattack caused injury or death to a dozen 
people, and a resulting cyber counter-attack caused injury or death to a 
thousand people, with little correlation to a military advantage or gain, then it 
appears such a situation would not be appropriate within the context of the 
LOAC.  Second, taking into account that a counter-attack to cyberterrorism 
should target the military objectives contributing to the enemy's war-fighting 
or war-sustaining capability, then disabling or damaging the adversary’s 
network servers and computer infrastructure, which are routinely used by the 
                                                          
50 U.S. Department of the Navy, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations, para 8.1.1.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid., para. 8.1.2.1. 
53 Executive Office of the President, The Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington, 
D.C.: White House, 2003), 50, available at: https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf. 
54 Clay, Computer Attack and Cyber Terrorism, 18-19. 
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aggressor to conduct attacks, would seem to be in agreement with the tenets 
of the LOAC. 
 
A response to a cyberattack does not need to be military in nature, but may 
entail nonmilitary actions, such as economic or financial measures.  For 
example, in light of the inordinate and ever growing number of cyberattacks 
against U.S. systems reaching a threshold to consider a national emergency, 
President Obama issued an executive order in April 2015, seeking to 
negatively affect the finances of those behind the attacks.  The President’s 
executive order states:  
 
“Starting today, we’re giving notice to those who pose 
significant threats to our security or economy by damaging 
our critical infrastructure, disrupting or hijacking our 
computer networks, or stealing the trade secrets of 
American companies or the personal information of 
American citizens for profit.”55   
 
The executive order gives the U.S. Department of Treasury the authority to 
impose sanctions on individuals or entities responsible for cyberattacks and 
cyber espionage.  In effect, the order allows the freezing of assets when 
passing through the U.S. financial system and prohibiting those responsible 
for the cyberattacks from transacting with U.S. companies. 
 
Counterarguments 
There are several counterarguments to the contention that deterrence is 
effective against cyberterrorism.  Jim Lewis, for example, has argued that 
deterrence will not work in the cyber domain.56  Lewis states that asymmetric 
vulnerability to attack, new classes of opponents with very different tolerance 
of risk, and the difficulty of crafting a proportional and credible response all 
erode the ability to deter in the cyber and space domains.57  He notes that 
public and private entities in the United States experience cyberattacks on a 
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daily basis, and if these attacks are deterrable, then the U.S. government is 
doing a terrible job of leveraging our capabilities.58 
 
Other critics argue that the use of cyber weapons in response to an act of 
cyber aggression could cause effects that are widespread and severe, thereby 
exceeding the guidance of the LOAC.59  These resulting effects of cyber 
weapons may be difficult to limit or control.  There is the fear that if a 
computer software attack is targeted against a terrorist group, then it is 
possible that the malicious code might inadvertently spread throughout the 
Internet.  This could severely affect or shut down critical infrastructure 
systems in other non-combatant countries, including perhaps computers 
operated by the United States and its allies and partners.  
 
Still other critics say that choosing an actual target for a military response 
following an act of cyberterrorism instigated by a non-state actor could prove 
problematic, since non-state sponsored terrorists may not have clear 
geographic boundaries, making it difficult to avoid affecting civilians.  The 
critical civilian computer systems within the country hosting the terrorist 
group may be adversely affected by a U.S. cyberattack against the terrorists’ 
computers and network, thereby resulting in effects that are noncompliant 
with the principle of lawful targeting.  This exact problem is why some 
strategists and policymakers have long argued that deterrence is ineffective 
against terrorist leadership, since it could appear that a credible response 
following a cyberterrorism may not be viable. 
 
Finally, other critics could point out that the United States and other 
countries would not be bound by the LOAC following a cyberattack by 
terrorists because terrorists are unlawful combatants who do not follow the 
LOAC’s provisions.  After all, unlawful combatants are by definition 
individuals who directly participate in hostilities without being authorized by 
a governmental authority, and non-state-sponsored terrorists fall in this 
category.  Nevertheless, any U.S. response to a cyberattack by terrorists—that 
is, by unlawful combatants—should follow the LOAC’s tenets.  Indeed, the 
LOAC addresses terrorist actions specifically by noting that unlawful 
combatants who engage in hostilities are in violation of the LOAC and in 
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doing so become lawful targets.60  Consequently, such terrorists may be killed 
or wounded and, if captured, may be tried as war criminals for their actions.61  
 
A Holistic Strategy of Prevention 
The goal of a strategy seeking to prevent an act of cyberterrorism is to cause 
the leadership of an organization to decide that an attack is not worth the cost 
or that the attack will fail in achieving the desired objectives.  As a result, this 
strategy of prevention should lead these leaders or decision makers to not 
choose an act of cyberterrorism.  While a credible threat of a military 
response or force is necessary for deterrence to be effective, any means 
available to achieve this goal of prevention should be considered part of a 
suitable strategy.  Specifically, other means could include nonmilitary 
activities if they support discouraging a potential adversary from pursuing an 
act of cyberterrorism.  Consequently, an overall strategy of prevention should 
include both military and nonmilitary approaches that integrate and layer 
activities. Such a strategy represents a holistic approach for dealing with the 
threat of cyberterrorism.  These military and nonmilitary activities working 
together to support the goal of prevention can be categorized as deterrence 
and dissuasion. 
 
Deterrence 
As previously addressed and despite its limitations in affecting the decision-
making calculus of a few leaders, deterrence remains a viable concept for 
discouraging cyberterrorism.  Many terrorist organizations, including al-
Qaida and the Islamic State, are thought to function strategically and 
rationally.62  For this reason, deterrence is still a relevant consideration.  
There is nothing within the LOAC that explicitly prohibits a military response 
to an act of cyberterrorism, even one that is non-state sponsored.  As long as 
the principles of military necessity and lawful targeting are duly considered, 
both military and nonmilitary responses are viable options.  
 
By conducting persistent and aggressive counterterrorism operations to seek 
out the most militant terrorist organizations, the United States can increase a 
potential adversary's perception that there would be a credible threat of force 
and unacceptable consequence following any attack against the United States. 
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If Islamic State or al-Qaida's leadership believed that following an act of 
cyberterrorism the United States would systematically seek them through 
military or nonmilitary mean and threaten their survival and power base, they 
might be deterred from conducting a life threatening cyberattack.  
 
In the case of state-sponsored cyberterrorism, the knowledge that the United 
States has the option to respond “in an appropriate manner” to a cyberattack 
may increase the likelihood of deterring states that are involved in 
cyberterrorism.  Therefore, if a hostile state enables terrorists to conduct 
cyberattacks against the United States or its interests, a U.S. response may 
include both cyber and non-cyber options.  While the problems inherent in 
selecting a suitable military objective associated with an act of non-state-
sponsored terrorism have been noted previously, these problems are 
mitigated in a scenario involving a supporting or facilitating state, because 
clear geographic boundaries facilitate taking reasonable precautions to help 
ensure that collateral damage and incidental injury are avoided as much as 
possible. 
 
Dissuasion 
Besides deterrence, the other part of a holistic strategy is dissuasion, which 
seeks to influence the leadership of potential adversaries by discouraging the 
initiation of military competition.63  To be effective, dissuasion activities must 
occur before a threat manifests itself.  Dissuasion includes “shaping 
activities,” which are typically nonmilitary in scope and conducted during 
peacetime.64  Within the lexicon of the U.S. military services, dissuasion is 
said to work outside the potential threat of military action.  A strategy 
incorporating dissuasion to influence potential cyber adversaries would seek 
to convey the futility of cyberattacks, thereby causing a potential adversary’s 
leadership not to seek a military confrontation.65  Worth noting is that some 
strategists think that those dissuaded from competing with the United States 
should not need to be deterred.66  With respect to dissuading those 
considering cyberattacks, such an approach should focus on three areas: 
resilience, forensics, and monetary interception. 
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Resilience efforts, such as those encompassing redundant network hardware 
and Internet connectivity pathways, hold promise in making a notable 
improvement in situations following a widespread and potentially devastating 
cyberattack.  Significant preparations that improve cyber resilience and 
mitigate and manage the consequences following an act of cyberterrorism can 
cause an adversary’s leadership to determine that a cyberattack will not cause 
the desired destructive effects.  Consequently, if an adversary’s leadership 
determines that a cyberattack is unlikely to achieve their objectives, they may 
refrain from conducting such an attack in the first place, or decide to pursue 
another path of causing destruction, such as conventional kinetic attacks.  
 
The second aspect of dissuasion is having a reliable and responsive cyber 
forensics capability.  As defined here, cyber forensics is the science of 
analyzing and determining the origination source and pathway of a 
cyberattack after such an attack has occurred, for law enforcement or defense 
counterintelligence purposes.  After an act of cyberterrorism, post-attack 
cyber forensics capabilities will attempt to use any “electronic fingerprints” or 
other network and software information to facilitate an attribution 
determination regarding the source and identity of those responsible for 
launching the cyberattack.  Admittedly, identification and follow-on 
attribution can be difficult tasks because attackers can use computer 
intermediaries or channel their attack through anonymizing proxies that hide 
their Internet protocol address.67  Nonetheless, a robust and publically-known 
capability to identify and attribute the source of cyberattack could dissuade 
prospective cyberterrorists or those supporting their efforts.  A successful 
identification and attribution of a cyberattack may lead to prosecution 
through civilian courts, or for more significant acts of aggression, lead to 
targeting with kinetic or non-kinetic weapons.   
 
The last area for dissuading cyberterrorism involves aggressive efforts to 
intercept and minimize the funding streams used by those involved in 
cyberterrorism.  Such intercepting actions may also be called counter threat 
finance and sanction activities.68  Funding is acknowledged as being critical to 
sustaining the activities of many organization involved in terrorism, to 
include non-state actors.  In the past, such funding to terrorist organizations 
has come through charities, illegal activities, and front companies. Persistent 
multinational fiscal interdiction efforts could significantly reduce the funding 
available to organizations that are most likely to conduct cyberterrorism. 
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Current U.S. Department of State counter threat finance and sanction 
activities seek to target those financial transactions benefiting terrorist 
organizations, whether coming from states, nongovernmental organizations, 
or private entities.69  A sustained effort to eliminate or minimize funding 
sources used by terrorist organizations could help curtail future recruits for 
the organization's cause.  When combined with cyber resilience and forensics 
efforts, a terrorist organization's leaders may decide not to seek a direct 
confrontation through cyberterrorism. 
 
Conclusion 
When dissuasion works with deterrence as part of a broad strategy of 
prevention, there is an increased likelihood of discouraging a potential 
adversary’s leadership from pursuing acts of cyberterrorism.  History 
suggests, however, that deterrence will at times fail due to miscalculation, 
uncertainty, or chance.  This may also be the case for deterring acts of 
cyberterrorisms.  If deterrence fails and an attack occurs, having measures in 
place to manage the consequences of a widespread and destructive 
cyberattack could reduce or limit the damage.  A side benefit of a strategy 
incorporating both deterrence and dissuasion concepts is that a broader range 
of potential state adversaries may be deterred or dissuaded from conducting 
relatively “routine” or commonplace cyberattacks on the United States or its 
interests, because it would seem doubtful that the desired effects can be 
achieved or that such an attack was worth the cost.  Perhaps paradoxically, it 
has been observed that the success in "the ‘war on terror’ is likely to make 
terrorists turn increasingly to unconventional weapons such as 
cyberterrorism.”70  While some terrorism experts have concluded that, at least 
for now, truck bombs, terrorist financing, and recruitment seem to pose a 
greater threat than cyberterrorism, the potential cyberterrorism threat cannot 
be ignored.  
 
Even though an act of cyberterrorism may seem improbable, many 
considered the 9/11 attacks improbable beforehand as well.  Countless 
ordinary citizens and politicians within the United States regret that more 
was not done to improve counterterrorism capabilities and strategies before 
the 9/11 attacks, especially since many of the needed improvements seemed 
obvious afterwards.  Likewise, the time is now to act in implementing a sound 
and comprehensive strategy to deter and dissuade cyberterrorism, and not 
after such an attack has occurred. 
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